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sales. Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (1939) 52
HARV. L. REV. 617. The contention here is that to allow the seller
state to tax gives a competitive advantage to states without or with
very low sales taxes, while to allow only buyer states to tax affects
all sellers equally. A practical answer to this contention is that if
taxes imposed by seller states puts the sellers at a competitive dis-
advantage, such taxes are not likely to be either large or numerous.
(In the O'Kane case the tax was expedient only because of the ab-
sence of effective out-of-state competition with the New York Stock
Exchange.) See Note (1940) 8 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 132. These con-
flicting arguments, and the apparent inconsistency of the Supreme
Court in decisions involving taxation of interstate commerce, lend force
to another alternative. This is the position of Justices Black, Frank-
furter, and Douglas, that the solution lies not in judicial action, but
in federal legislation. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S.
176, 183 (1940). F. L., Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
VIOLATION OF STATUTE BARS COMPENSATION
Plaintiff was employed by defendant solely as a "loader" in de-
fendant's mine. Finding an electrically operated machine in the way
of his work, the plaintiff moved it, instead of calling a skilled worker
hired to handle this equipment. During this moving the plaintff was
injured. Held, compensation denied. In operating this electrical ma-
chine, the plaintiff violated a statutory duty and thereby took himself
out of the "course of his employment."It
The general rule in workmen's compensation actions is in accord
with the principal case.2 However, many jurisdictions refuse to allow
a mere violation of such a statute to bar compensation and hold that
unless the employee was guilty of "wilful misconduct" or "wilful fail-
ure or refusal to perform"3 a statutory duty he was not acting out-
side the course of his employment and may recover.4 This gives to
the violation only the effect of negligence, which does not bar recov-
1 Kozak v. Reilly Coal Co., 15 A (2d) 531 (Pa. Super. 1940). The statut-
ory duty involved is contained in General Rule 12 of Article XXV of
the Bituminous Mining Act. Pa. Laws 1911, p. 827 Pa. Statutes
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 52, §1292: "All persons are forbidden to med-
dle or tamper in any way with any electric or signal wires, or
any other equipment in or about the mine."
2 Bugh v. Employers' Reinsurance Corp., 63 F. (2d) 36 (C.C.A. 5th,
1933); Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co., 217 Mich. 508, 187 N.W. 352,
23 A.L.R. 1153 (1922); Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290
Pa. 480, 139 Atl. 192 (1927).
3 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1208: "No compensation shall
be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's .
wilful failure or refusal to perform any statutory duty . . . "2 Cf.
Va. Acts 1918, c. 400, § 14.
4Union Colliery Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Ill. 561, 132 N.E.
200, 23 A.L.R. 1150 (1921); Nester v. H. Korn Baking Co., 194
Iowa 1270, 190 N.W. 949 (1922); Rushville School Township v.
Mock, 86 Ind. App. 307, 157 N.E. 366 (1927).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ery under workmen's compensation acts.5 The employee must have
actual knowledge or reason to know of the existence of the statutory
prohibition before his breach will be judged "wilful" and bar recovery.
This places upon the employer the duty to post notices of the statutory
requirement in conspicuous places in the vicinity of the work or other-
wise make a reasonable attempt to give notice to the employee of the
statutory requirement.7 In all jurisdictions recovery will not be de-
nied for violation of a statute unless such violation is the proximate
cause of the injury.8
That the rule in the principal case works a hardship upon em-
ployees, for whose benefit the workmen's compensation acts were de-
signed,0 is evident.' 0 Pennsylvania in 1937 attempted to modify the
rule by inserting in its workmen's compensation act a section to allow
recovery by an employee who was injured while violating a law,11 but
this provision was declared unconstitutional.12 In 1939 the unconsti-
tutional section was repealed and another enacted to the effect that
no compensation shall be paid when the injury or death is caused by
the employee's violation of a law.' 3 This last revision was not men-
tioned in the opinion of the principal case, but it clearly applies and
sustains the holding.
England attempted a modification, similar to that of Pennsylvania,
5 Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889 (1922); Dzikowska
v. Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578, 103 Atl. 351 (1918); HARPER,
TORTS (1933) §215.
6 Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571, 183 So.
871, 110 A.L.R. 1403 (1938); Kuhner Packing Co. v. Hitchins,
97 Ind. App. 228, 186 N.E. 262, (1933).7 Kuhner Packing Co. v. Hitchins, 97 Ind. App. 228, 186 N.E. 262
(1933); King v. Empire Colleries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S.E. 478,
58 A.L.R. 197 (1927). Cf. Fortin v. Beaver Coal Co., 217 Mich.
508, 187 N.W. 352, 23 A.L.R. 1153 (1922).
s Cooper v. Hamner, 98 Ind. App. 272, 187 N.E. 407 (1933) ; Kimball's
Case, 132 Me. 193, 168 Atl. 871 (1933); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Peppers, 133 S.W. (2d) 165 (Texas, 1939). Cf. Sand v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 218, 10 A. (2d) 820
(1940). But see Bugh v. Employers' Reinsurance Corp., 63 F. (2d).
36 (C.C.A. 5th, 1933).
9BOYD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1913) §4; HARPER, TORTS (1933)
§207.
'
0 Legis. (1937) 12 Temple L.R. 115.
"Pa. Laws 1937, No. 323, §301 (b).
12 Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 7 A. (2d) 302 (1936).
The Pennsylvania legislature derives its power to enact a work-
men's compensation act from Article III, §21 of the constitution.
This authorization lays down three fundamental requirements of
the act: (1) The compensation required of employers must be
"reasonable," (2) the injuries must arise "in the course of em-
ployment," (3) the act must provide for benefits to be paid by
the employers to their employees. The court stated that since
it had held that an employee who is injured while violating a law
is not injured "in the course of employment," Shoffler v. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 480, 139 Atl. 192, (1927), to allow com-
pensation to an employee who was injured during such a violation
is a contravention of the second requirement.
13 Pa. Laws 1939, No. 281, §301 (a) and (b).
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by allowing recovery to an employee injured while violating a statutory
duty if the act of the employee was done in connection with his em-
ployer's business.14 The English courts have used this last phrase as
the basis of a distinction in the cases and have allowed recovery where
the employees, when injured, were doing some act which they were
hired to do, 15 and have denied it where the act resulting in an injury
was performed in executing a task for their own benefit or to which
they were not assigned.'0
The dissatisfaction of the legislatures with the decisions is evi-
denced by the attempts in Pennsylvania and England to allow com-
pensation where a statutory violation is involved. Since workmen's
compensation acts were conceived to assure quick, inexpensive, certain,
and reasonably adequate economic relief to injured workmen, 17 it seems
that judicial attempts to define "course of employment" has led to
denial of compensation in many cases involving statutory violations
where the legislatures contemplated allowing recovery.
From a theoretical standpoint, the decisions denying recovery may
be criticized on the ground that they allow the employer the old and
supposedly outlawed defense of negligence of the employee.1s While it
is not contended that an employee should be allowed to recover for an
injury sustained as the result of an intentional and reckless disregard
of a statutory rule set up for his protection, it does seem harsh to
deny recovery where the employee unknowingly violates the provisions
of some obscure statute. It appears that Indiana and states with
similar provisions have reached the result which is consistent with the
underlying theory of workmen's compensation acts by requiring that
the employee wilfully fail or refuse to perform a statutory duty be-
fore such failure or refusal will bar his recovery of compensation.
J. L. F.
'4 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, 15 and 16 Geo. 5, 84, §1(2).
Before this statute a statutory violation barred recovery. Moore
and Co. v. Donnelly (1921), 1 A.C. 329.
15 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., Ltd. v. M'Ferrin (1926) A.C. 377
(compensation allowed mine "fireman" injured by an explosion
of an unfired shot when he went back to inspect it before the time
provided by statute had elapsed.)
21 Garrallan Coal Co. v. Anderson (1927) A.C. 59 (pit-bottomer crushed
by descending cage when he crossed the pit while the cages were
in motion, contrary to a statutory prohibition; it did not appear
the plaintiff crossed for a purpose connected with the employer's
business and so compensation was denied); Kerr or M'Aulay v.
James Dunlop and Co., Ltd. (1926) A.C. 377 (mine worker as-
sisting a "fireman" coupled the cable to the detonator, this being
the "fireman's" task and in violation of a statute; the mine worker
was injured in the subsequent explosion caused by accidental
touching of the firing handle; compensation denied. Note that this
case was considered by the House of Lords along with the case in
footnote 15, but that the opposite result was obtained here.)
17 See note 9, supra.
18 Western Pacific R.R. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 193 Cal. 413,
224 Pac. 754 (1924).
